By Archimandrite of the Ecumenical Throne Gerasimos Fragkoulakis
Hanover, Germany
January 16, 2026
Hanover, Germany
January 16, 2026
The historical course of relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian Orthodox Church has often been marked by periods of tension. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, as the “First among equals” in the administrative structure of Orthodoxy, has always held the role of guarantor of ecclesiastical order and the unity of the Local Churches, according to the words “that they may be one” (John 17:21). The Russian Church, recognized as a Patriarchate in the sixteenth century, developed a strong national and ecclesiastical identity, often desiring to play a leading role within the Orthodox world.
Although the Church of Constantinople constitutes the Mother Church of the Patriarchate of Moscow, the Church of Russia has never ceased, from the very moment of its foundation, to attempt to diminish and downgrade the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
The incidents that demonstrate this stance of the Russian Church are very numerous, and their description could fill many volumes. We shall mention only some of them, which highlight the transgressive course of the Patriarchate of Moscow.
Even its recognition as an Autocephalous Church constituted a violation of ecclesiastical order. Until the fifteenth century, the Russian Church was subject to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In 1448, however, Russian hierarchs, under the pressure of developments that followed in Constantinople, proceeded unilaterally to the election of their own Metropolitan, Jonah, without informing the Ecumenical Patriarchate. This action constituted the first step toward the arbitrary independence of Russian ecclesiastical administration. Full and official recognition came in 1589, when the Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah was in Moscow and, after political and economic pressure, signed the Act recognizing the Patriarchate of Moscow and Patriarch Job as the legitimate Primate of the Russian Church, thus marking the full autocephaly of the Church of Russia.
From the very beginning, the Patriarchate of Moscow, cultivating the misleading narrative of the “Third Rome,” began to function as a potential leader of world Orthodoxy, always projecting its numerical strength to the faithful — a number that increased especially during the period of the Soviet Union, when many countries were annexed to it and their Churches were compelled to come under the Russian Church.
As mentioned above, reference will be made to some of the many cases that exist and that highlight the transgressive behavior of the Russian Church.
Thus, contrary to what it ought to have done, and by arbitrarily violating ecclesiastical acts and the Holy Canons, the Patriarchate of Moscow established and maintained ecclesiastical structures in Western Europe and in America. These ecclesiastical structures include mainly the Archdiocese of Russian Churches in Western Europe and the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR). The Archdiocese of Russian Churches in Western Europe was founded in 1921, after the Russian Revolution, to serve Russian émigrés (persons forced to leave their country, usually due to political, social, or economic upheavals, and to settle in another country as migrants or exiles) who fled to France, Germany, and other European countries. ROCOR was founded in 1920 in the United States, in response to political upheavals and the rupture with Moscow, and developed mainly in America but also on other continents.
Furthermore, the Patriarchate of Moscow later established parishes and dioceses in many countries of Western Europe (Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom), mainly after the Second World War, to serve Russian migrants and Orthodox faithful who settled there. In America, in addition to ROCOR, the Orthodox Church in America (OCA) was founded, which initially was under the jurisdiction of Moscow and received autocephaly from the Patriarchate of Moscow in 1970.
The Autocephalous Orthodox Church in America (OCA) is recognized as autocephalous primarily by the Patriarchate of Moscow and by some other Orthodox Churches that maintain close relations with the Russian Church, such as the Patriarchate of Georgia, the Patriarchate of Bulgaria, and the Orthodox Church of Poland. However, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, as well as most other Local Orthodox Churches, do not recognize the OCA as autocephalous, considering that canonical jurisdiction for the Orthodox Church in America belongs to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Thus, the OCA remains in a peculiar situation, in which its autocephaly is accepted only by specific Churches and not by the whole of Orthodoxy.
In 1996 the Ecumenical Patriarchate restored the Autonomous Church of Estonia. The Russian Church reacted by placing the Ecumenical Patriarchate in a state of non-communion, severing its relations with the Phanar and maintaining its own ecclesiastical administration.
For clarification: the term non-communion in ecclesiastical terminology refers to the severance of ecclesiastical and liturgical communion between two or more ecclesiastical bodies or persons. This means that the parties in non-communion do not participate together in the Divine Eucharist, the sacred services, or the sacraments, essentially interrupting all official relations of cooperation and communication at the ecclesiastical level. Non-communion is a serious measure, usually taken in response to doctrinal or canonical disagreements.
In several cases, the Patriarchate of Moscow annexed parishes that belonged to other Orthodox Churches, such as in Moldova and Georgia, thus provoking strong dissatisfaction and protests from the respective Churches.
The Patriarchate of Moscow maintained control of the Orthodox Church in Japan and in China, even though these belong to the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
In 2014 Moscow did not recognize the decisions of the Pan-Orthodox Synaxis of the Primates at the Phanar, citing various disagreements.
In 2016, although the Russian Church had imposed many of its demands, it did not participate in the Holy and Great Council of Crete and attempted, until the very last moment, to sabotage it.
In 2018 the Ecumenical Patriarchate granted autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The Russian Church reacted strongly, breaking Eucharistic communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and shortly thereafter also with the Patriarchate of Alexandria, the Church of Greece, and the Church of Cyprus because they recognized the Autocephalous Church of Ukraine, while it continues, in various ways, to exert pressure — possibly even threats — on other Orthodox Churches so that they will not recognize it.
In 2019 it established the Exarchate of Africa, appointing clergy and buying off some of them, and founded parishes in the canonical territories of the Patriarchate of Alexandria, in retaliation against the Patriarch of Alexandria for recognizing the autocephaly of the Church of Ukraine.
The Russian Orthodox Church has repeatedly expressed its support for Vladimir Putin and his policies, especially after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. Patriarch Kirill of Moscow has publicly justified Russia’s actions, attributing a religious dimension to the war and advancing the argument of defending Russian values and Orthodoxy, thus reinforcing the political line of the Kremlin. However, there are also voices within the Russian Church that express disagreement or concern about the war, although these remain a minority and often face restrictions or persecution.
It goes without saying that the attack launched by the Russian secret services against the Ecumenical Patriarch enjoys the acceptance and support of the Patriarchate of Moscow.
The Russian Orthodox Church declares that it preserves Orthodox doctrine unadulterated; nevertheless, many of its actions have provoked questioning and reactions from other Orthodox Churches.
In conclusion, the stance and actions of the Russian Orthodox Church in recent years have contributed significantly to the shaping of a new ecclesiastical landscape, full of challenges and tensions.
Source: Translated by John Sanidopoulos.
